

Table 1: COUNTRY MEANS FOR TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS AND PEOPLE

Trust in:	BUL	CZE	SLK	HUN	POL	ROM	RUS	SLV	BEL	UKR	ALL
Parties	2.7	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.7
Courts	3.0	3.5	3.8	4.0	3.7	3.9	3.4	3.6	3.6	2.7	3.5
Police	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.1	3.9	3.1	2.4	3.5
Parliament	3.1	2.9	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.4	2.7	3.1	3.5	2.3	3.1
President/Prime Minister	4.1	4.5	3.1	3.7	3.9	4.4	2.6	3.9	4.1	2.5	3.7
Military	4.6	3.8	4.7	4.1	4.6	5.4	3.7	3.9	4.3	3.9	4.3
Churches	3.4	3.6	4.1	3.8	4.4	5.6	3.4	3.1	4.8	4.4	4.1
Trade unions	2.7	3.7	3.6	2.9	3.6	3.8	2.6	3.5	3.5	2.5	3.2
Television & Radio	3.8	4.4	3.8	4.4	4.3	4.4	3.3	4.1	4.0	3.7	4.0
Press	3.6	4.4	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.2	3.3	4.1	3.9	3.6	4.0
Private enterprise	3.3	3.9	3.6	3.8	3.4	4.1	2.6	3.5	3.3	2.9	3.4
Average All Institutions	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.7	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.5	2.7	3.5
Trust in people	4.0	4.7	4.2	4.6	4.7	3.7	3.4	4.5	5.1	5.0	4.4

Note: Trust in institutions on a scale of 1 (great distrust) to 7 (great trust).

Source: New Democracies Barometer V (1998) and New Russia Barometer VII (1998).
Reproduced from Mishler and Rose, 1998 Appendix A.

Table 2

Expectations of Fairness

	CZ	UKR	RUS
Proportion "Probably or Definitely" Expecting Fair Treatment from:			
Post Office	92	86	71
Bank	96	77	25
Local Grocery Shop	94	64	49
Doctor's Office	97	66	83
Police	84	35	51
School Head	93	80	—

Degree of Trust in Police on a Scale of 1 to 7

Trusts (5-7)	29	12	19
Neutral (4)	25	10	15

Minimum proportion who expect fair treatment from the police even though they distrust them. (Share stating that they probably or definitely expect fair treatment minus those who rank the police from 4-7 in terms of trust)

	30	13	17
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Source: New Democracies Barometer V 1998; Russia Social Capital Survey 1998. Table derived from Rose and Haerpfer 1998a:59, 98 (table 6.2), Rose, 2000: 28.

Table 3: PROBLEMS DEALING WITH PUBLIC AGENCIES

	<u>Strategy</u>			
	Corrupt, connections	Cajole	Market	Passive
<i>1. Getting into university without good enough grades</i>				
Czech Republic	7	2	72	18
Russia	33	6	39	22
Ukraine	31	3	45	21
<i>2. Actions to get a better flat when not entitled to publicly subsidized housing</i>				
Czech Republic	14	23	48	15
Russia	45	n.a.	30	25
Ukraine	34	10	28	27
<i>3. Action if an official delays issuing a government permit</i>				
Czech Republic	35	46	n.a.	19
Russia	62	18	n.a.	20
Ukraine	61	18	n.a.	21
<i>4. Getting treatment for a painful disease when hospital says one must wait for months</i>				
Czech Republic	24	31	31	14
Russia	57	13	11	19
Ukraine	39	12	34	15

Corrupt, connections: Offer bribe, use connections, make up a story

Cajole: Write a letter of complaint, push officials to act

Market: Buy what you want legally (education: pay a tutor)

Passive: Nothing can be done

Data from New Democracies Barometer V 1998; Russia Social Capital Survey 1998.

Rose and Haerpfer 1998a:96, Table 6.1.

Table 4: Likely that person would have to...

Suppose a person asks an official for something to which he/she is entitled by law. Q85-7: To get a successful outcome, is it likely or not likely that he/she would...

	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Bulgaria	Ukraine
	%	%	%	%
Q85: approach official through a contact	76	87	86	90
Q86: offer a small present	62	80	84	91
Q87: offer money or an expensive present	44	62	72	81

Likely that person would have to offer money etc to...

Q60-70: Now think of a person seeking something to which they are entitled by law. Is it likely or not likely that such a person would have to offer money, a present or a favour to get help from each of the following - I mean offer more than the official charge?

	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Bulgaria	Ukraine
	%	%	%	%
Q63: officials in state ministries	70	85	82	87
Q60: hospital doctors	47	89	93	94
Q67: customs officials	53	71	92	86
Q65: court officials	44	75	80	87
Q68: MPs	54	74	74	80
Q62: university staff	34	78	73	89
Q64: officials in local government offices	49	58	79	87
Q66: the police	42	64	72	89
Q69: elected officials on local councils	44	52	69	80
Q70: people working in the private sector	42	55	63	61
Q61: school teachers	10	36	45	68

Note: 'don't know', 'mixed/depends' answers etc were recorded if given spontaneously, but never prompted; they have been excluded from the calculation of percentages.

Source: Miller, Grodeland, and Koshechkina (1998, Table 5,6).

Table 5: Citizens' feelings about giving money or a present

Q103: Suppose people gave money or a present to an official and got what they wanted, would they be most likely to feel...

Q104: But if they thought very few other people gave such things to officials, would they then be most likely to feel...

	Czech Republic		Slovakia		Bulgaria		Ukraine	
	Q 103	Q 104	Q 103	Q 104	Q 103	Q 104	Q 103	Q 104
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
happy	50	15	63	18	66	36	55	22
angry	25	36	23	37	13	20	11	24
worried	7	15	5	14	11	16	18	34
ashamed	18	34	8	31	11	29	16	20

Note: 'don't know', 'mixed/depends' etc answers were recorded if given spontaneously, but never prompted; they have been excluded from the calculation of percentages.

Source: Miller, Grodeland, and Koshechkina (1998, Table 23).

Table 6: Differences between specific occupations within the same institution

	All services average	<u>Health services</u>			<u>Education services</u>			<u>Welfare services</u>			<u>Police services</u>			<u>Legal services</u>		
		Doctors	Nurses	Administrators	Univ. Teachers	Univ. Admin	School-teachers	Pensions	Benefits	Housing	Traffic Police	Ordinary police	Administrators	Courts	Customs	Passports
	%	D	N	A	UT	UA	S	P	B	H	T	O	A	Cts	Cust	P
would accept a small present if offered	47	75	70	51	52	45	53	51	45	49	42	31	36	29	39	42
would accept money or an expensive present if offered	17	31	27	26	15	10	14	13	12	18	19	11	14	10	20	14
accepted a gift from a client recently	58	89	75	70	59	50	67	59	62	56	56	37	49	44	48	49
accepted money or an expensive gift form a client recently	5	16	2	10	5	1	1	1	3	3	12	2	5	1	6	0

Source: Miller, Grodeland, and Koshechkina (June 1999, Table 10).

Table 7a

Date	91	92	93	95	98
Approval of Communist Regime					
Poland	34	42	38	25	30
CEE	36	44	41	40	41
Approval of Current Regime					
Poland	52	56	69	76	66
CEE	58	60	61	65	57
Hopeful for Regime in 5 Years					
Poland	70	69	84	90	72
CEE	81	77	78	79	71
Better to Restore Communist Regime					
Poland	–	–	18	8	14
CEE	–	–	15	16	20
Military Rule Better					
Poland	–	–	11	5	6
CEE	–	–	9	6	7
Support Unelected Strong Leader					
Poland	–	31	35	33	28
CEE	–	38	30	23	22
Suspension of Parliament Might Happen					
Poland	56	60	53	62	10
CEE	37	33	35	28	17
Approval of Current Economy					
Poland	31	39	50	68	61
CEE	34	35	39	46	39
Hopeful for Economy in 5 Years					
Poland	58	57	71	86	70
CEE	73	71	70	72	62
Satisfied with Family's Economic Situation					
Poland	17	23	25	35	44
CEE	35	38	36	37	37

Source: Rose and Haerpfer, 1998b, SPP 308.

Table 7b

Proportion expressing a high degree of trust in listed institution (i.e. 5-7 on a scale of 1-7)

Date	91	92	93	95	98
Government					
Poland	-	25	21	23	
CEE	-	-	29	31	26
Parliament					
Poland	-	23	24	25	
CEE	-	-	21	24	23
President					
Poland	-	20	29	40	
CEE	-	-	50	39	40
Civil Servants					
Poland	-	23	25	28	
CEE	-	-	27	25	31
Courts					
Poland	-	35	38	30	
CEE	-	-	36	36	31
Political Parties					
Poland	-	7	9	9	
CEE	-	-	14	15	13
Military					
Poland	-	59	54	53	
CEE	-	-	50	51	44
Police					
Poland	-	43	37	32	
CEE	-	-	35	35	33
Media ¹					
Poland	-	34	43	44	
CEE	-	-	35	42	41
Church					
Poland	-	38	47	51	
CEE	-	-	40	41	41

Source: New Democracies Barometers I-V.

¹ 1998 figures are an average of separate scores for print and electronic media.

Table 8
Nonprofit Share of GDP and Employment, 1995 (1)

	GDP	Excluding Religious Worship		Including Religious Worship		Volunteer FTES as share of all Nonprofit FTES
		Paid Empolymnt	Paid Employment and Volunteers	Paid Employment	Paid Employment and Volunteers	
Western Europe *	-	7.0	10.3	7.0	11.2	38
Other Developed *	-	6.9	9.4	7.3	10.4	30
22 Country Average *	4.6	4.8	6.9	5.6	8.5	34
Czech Republic	1.6	1.7	2.7	1.8	2.9	38
Hungary (2)	2.8	1.3	1.6	-	-	19
Poland (3)	-	1.0	1.2	-	-	17
Romania	0.3	0.6	1.3	0.6	1.4	57
Slovakia	1.3	0.9	1.2	1.0	1.4	29

Other Developed: Australia, Israel, Japan, United States

* unweighted averages

1) Non-agricultural employment in full-time equivalents (FTES), excluding religious worship.

2) Figures for Hungary in 1990 for employment are 1.2% of GDP, 0.8 of paid employment and 1.5% including volunteers, for a volunteer share of 47%.

3) 1997 data.

Source: Salamon, et al. 2000 and <http://www.jhu.edu/~cnp/research.html>.

Table 9: Nonprofit Revenues (with and without volunteer labor), 1995

Country	Excluding Volunteer Labor			Including Volunteer Labor		
	Share of Revenue from: public funds	private giving	fees	Share of Revenue from: public funds	private giving	fees
West Europe *	56	7	37	43	30	28
Other Developed *	43	8	49	38	20	43
22 Country Average *	40	10	49	32	26	41
Central Europe						
Czech Rep	39	14	47	32	30	38
Hungary	27	18	55	26	21	53
Romania	45	26	29	21	66	13
Slovakia	22	23	55	21	55	54

* unweighted averages

Other developed: Australia, Israel, Japan, United States.

Source: Salamon et al. 1999 and <http://www.jhu.edu/~cnp/research.html>.

Table 10: Business/State Interactions

	<u>Poland</u>	<u>Slovakia</u>	<u>Romania</u>	<u>Russia</u>	<u>Ukraine</u>
Percentage of sales not reported for all firms	5.4%	7.4%	5.7%	28.9% *	41.2%
Percentage of salaries not reported	8.6%	7.6%	7.6%	26.1% *	37.9%
Percentage of respondents who say firms make extralegal payments for government services	20.1%	38.2%	20.0%	91.2% *	86.9% *
Percent of respondents who say firms make extralegal payments for licenses	19.3%	42.2%	17.0%	91.7% *	87.5% *
Percent of respondents who say firms make payments for protection	7.9%	14.9%	0.6%	92.9% *	88.8% *
Percent of respondents who say courts cannot be used to enforce contracts	27.1%	32.1%	13.1%	44.2%	45.4%
Tax payments to government as a percent of sales for firms in industry	15.5%	16.4%	17.2%	26.9% *	28.0%
Other payments to government as percent of sales	3.9%	3.8%	4.8%	6.0% *	7.2% *
Profits in 1996 as a % of sales	10%	6%	13%	21%	18%
Percent of respondents who say firms make unofficial payments for ongoing registration	0.4%	3.0%	19.1%	80.0% *	76.9% *
Percent of respondents who say firms make unofficial payments for fire/sanitary inspection	2.8%	12.1%	21.8%	67.9% *	91.2% *
Percent of respondents who say firms make unofficial payments for tax inspection	0.8%	2.5%	17.3%	75.6% *	85.0% *
Percent of managers time spent on government/regulatory matters	10.3%	11.8%	8.0%	18.3%	25.4%
Number of respondents	303	308	321	269	270

* Response rate less than 50%. Some questions, especially those dealing with unofficial payments in Russia and Ukraine had very low response rates.

Sources: Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan and Woodruff (2000, Tables 1 and 2)
Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (September 5, 2000, Table 1).

Table 11: Official, Unofficial and Total Cost of Doing Business, By Item

	<u>Poland</u>	<u>Slovakia</u>	<u>Romania</u>	<u>Russia</u>	<u>Ukraine</u>
Phone line					
Official payment	\$177	\$160	\$162	\$240	\$159
Unofficial payment	\$34	\$25	\$25	\$426	\$464
Total payment	\$211	\$185	\$187	\$666	\$623
Unofficial as percent of total payment	16.1%	13.5%	13.4%	64.0%	74.5%
Percent of firms for which total is larger than official (i.e., make some unofficial payment)	11.4%	26.7%	38.9%	94.7%	94.5%
Initial Enterprise Registration					
Official	\$296	\$928	\$120	\$194	\$262
Unofficial	\$7	\$19	\$16	\$348	\$526
Total	\$303	\$947	\$136	\$542	\$788
Unofficial as percent of total	2.3%	2.0%	11.8%	64.2%	66.8%
Percentage of firms for which total is larger than official (i.e., make some unofficial payment)	1.4%	9.6%	25.4%	86.1%	90.6%
Continuing Registration					
Official	\$61	\$60	\$70	\$26	\$51
Unofficial	\$2	\$3	\$13	\$50	\$120
Total	\$63	\$63	\$83	\$76	\$171
Unofficial as percent of total	3.2%	4.8%	15.7%	65.8%	70.2%
Percent of firms for which total is larger than official (i.e., make some unofficial payment)	0.4%	3.0%	19.1%	74.1%	72.7%
Fire/Sanitary Inspector					
Official	\$52	\$50	\$15	\$2	\$38
Unofficial	\$3	\$17	\$5	\$31	\$86
Total	\$55	\$67	\$20	\$33	\$124
Unofficial as percent of total	5.5%	25.4%	25.0%	93.9%	69.4%
Percent of firms for which total is larger than official (i.e., make some unofficial payment)	2.8%	12.1%	21.8%	64.9%	88.0%
Tax Inspector					
Official	\$3	\$53	\$7	\$0	\$81
Unofficial	\$14	\$10	\$9	\$133	\$236
Total	\$17	\$63	\$16	\$133	\$317
Unofficial as percent of total	82.4%	15.9%	56.3%	100.0%	74.4%
Percent of firms for which total is larger than official (i.e., make some unofficial payment)	0.01	0.02	0.17	0.7	0.67

Note that "unofficial" payments are calculated as the difference between what firms report as the official and total cost for an item.

Source: Miller, Grodeland, and Koshechkina, August 1999.

Table 12: Measuring the capture economy (% of firms affected by 'purchase of...*)

Country	Parliamentary legislation	Presidential decrees	Central Bank	Criminal Courts	Commercial Courts	Party Finance	Capture Economy Index ⁺	Classification
Albania	12	7	8	22	20	25	16	Low
Armenia	10	7	14	5	6	1	7	Low
Azerbaijan	41	48	39	44	40	35	41	High
Belarus	9	5	25	0	5	4	8	Low
Bulgaria	28	26	28	28	19	42	28	High
Croatia	18	24	30	29	29	30	27	High
Czech Republic	18	11	12	9	9	6	11	Low
Estonia	14	7	8	8	8	17	10	Low
Georgia	29	24	32	18	20	21	24	High
Hungary	12	7	8	5	5	4	7	Low
Kazakhstan	13	10	19	14	14	6	12	Low
Kyrgyzstan	18	16	59	26	30	27	29	High
Latvia	40	49	8	21	26	35	30	High
Lithuania	15	7	9	11	14	13	11	Low
Moldova	43	30	40	33	34	42	37	High
Poland	13	10	6	12	18	10	12	Low
Romania	22	20	26	14	17	27	21	High
Russia	35	32	47	24	27	24	32	High
Slovak Republic	20	12	37	29	25	20	24	High
Slovenia	8	5	4	6	6	11	7	Low
Ukraine	44	37	37	21	26	29	32	High
Uzbekistan	5	4	8	5	9	4	6	Low
Overall (unweighted average)	21	18	23	18	18	20	20	

* Firms were asked whether corruption in each dimension had no impact; minor impact; significant impact; very significant impact on their business.

The table reports the proportion of firms reporting significant or very significant impact of state capture in each dimension.

+Calculated as the unweighted average of the six component indices.

Source: Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann September, 2000.